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Book reviews
Carol Myers-Scotton: Social Motivations for Code-Switching. Evidence
from Africa. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993. xii + 177 pp.
Carol Myers-Scotton: Duelling Languages. Grammatical Structure in
Codeswitching. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993. xiv-f 263pp.
Carol Myers-Scotton has worked on code switching (CS) since 1972,
when she was confronted with abundant CS data collected by her students
in a seminar in Nairobi. The present two volumes summarize and report
the results of her important work in the 20 years since then. One volume
presents a model accounting for the social motivations for CS, and the
companion volume focuses on structural constraints on intrasentential
CS. The books under review are clear and easy to read, although some-
times a bit fragmented in their presentation. Judging from the references
in recent articles concerning many different CS settings, Myers-Scotton's
work has developed into the dominant paradigm for present-day research
in this field, and it is appropriate to evaluate her contributions in some
detail.
In some ways the publication of the material in two separate books
has created a certain imbalance. Thus about half of Social Motivations
is devoted to preliminary issues: an overly detailed sketch of the African
setting (chapter 1, 9-44), and an interesting if somewhat biased history
of the field (chapter 5, 45-74). The crucial chapters of the book,
"Motivations for the markedness model" (chapter 4, 75-112) and "A
markedness model of code-switching" (chapter 5, 113-149), are some-
what sketchy on important issues. Furthermore, the separation of social
and structural concerns in separate volumes obscures some of the links
between them. Two examples: on p. 4 Myers-Scotton defines CS some-
what controversially as "the selection ... of forms from an embedded
language (or languages) in utterances of a matrix language ...." This
definition is in line with the author's structural work and fits much of
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the African material discussed (characterized by insertions) in that sense,
the exception being example (5) on p. 123. It makes it necessary, however,
to assume a going back and forth between different matrix languages
where, for example, Spanish-English CS in the US is discussed
(pp. 125-126). Yet it is not clear that the central notion of "unmarked
CS" as such, described on pp. 117-131, requires the concept of a matrix
language. Another example: on p. 6 Myers-Scotton briefly mentions the,
again controversial, issue of whether CS and borrowing need to be
distinguished but does not go into it, arguing that it is not relevant to
the issue of social motivations. Yet, it surely must be if the psychological
status of CS is different from that of borrowings, and indeed on
pp. 129-130 the issue comes up in relation to the Ottawa study reported
on in the work of Poplack and associates (Poplack et al. 1988). The
distinction is the focus of chapter 6 of Duelling Languages.
High time to turn to the core of Social Motivations, which will become
a central reference in the discussion of the social motivations for CS.
Carol Myers-Scotton stresses the important point that CS is not merely
a stage in the process of language shift or part of the performance of
imperfect bilinguals. Instead she emphasizes the regular and in some
sense unexceptional nature of CS in her markedness model. This model
is very elegant in avoiding a mere listing of functions, and in being
universally applicable (not just to CS but to all language use). It has the
potential to do justice to the dynamic nature of interactions and avoids
much criticized notions such as "we/they code" and "metaphorical vs.
situational CS."
On the other hand, it is also a static, nondevelopmental approach,
leaving many potentially interesting situations of CS out of the picture.
How is it possible that marked choices do not lead to an innovation in
the system (p. 141)? It emphasizes transactional encounters as opposed
to less risky ones. The emphasis on rights and obligations sets (RO sets)
makes language use seem to be a mere index of changing social relations,
neglecting other functions of language, such as creating a counter-dis-
course (Hill and Hill 1986), meta-linguistic commentary, clarification,
emphasis, etc. The latter functions are acknowledged (p. 149) as part of
unmarked CS; however, the possibility of a marked CS with such a
function appears to be ruled out, since a marked switch, according to
Myers-Scotton, is motivated by the wish "to negotiate an RO set other
than the unmarked one" (p. 149). Yet, some pages earlier (pp. 139-140)
she herself deals with marked switches creating aesthetic or stylistic
effects. These marked switches are clearly not motivated by the speaker's
wish to negotiate a marked RO set but rather by the intention to "call
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up 'something different' from what has been presented thus far or is
expected" (p. 140).
The author avoids dealing with the concept of speech community, a
concept crucial to the markedness model, which is based on sharedness
of norms (p. 61). At the same time, the emphasis is on the speaker, rather
than the audience. One place this becomes problematic is in a quote from
a letter to the author by a Tanzanian friend (p. 117), in which a request
for a loan goes with a switch from Swahili to English.
(1) ... Nina shida ya lazima sana ya pesa kwa sasa. Naomba sana
unisaide [I have a great need of money right now. I ask you to help
me]. Well, this is the first time since I knew you, I think, to borrow
money. I know money can break our friendship.
The switch is interpreted as an attempt by the embarassed writer to
distance himself from the request, and no mention is made of the fact
that the addressee is in fact a bilingual anglophone. To what extent are
the two a speech community?
A somewhat distorted picture of Gumperz (e.g. 1982) is given
(pp. 52-55), missing the correspondence between his framework and the
markedness model, for example with respect to Gumperz's cooccurrence
expectations and Myers-Scotton's unmarked choices. The lack of princi-
pled ways of analyzing specific interactions leads to the same ad hoc-ism
of which she accuses Gumperz. In fact Gumperz's work on contextualiza-
tion cues provides some actual methodological tools for penetrating
deeper into the process of how interactants signal and interpret saliency
and the relevance of situational factors to be used in inferencing the
marked or unmarked status of a situation.
One of the strong points of this beautifully produced book is the
elaborate examples, even if little phonological information is given about
pitch contours and pauses. They are a bit difficult to follow in detail for
a reader not familiar with Swahili or Shona, since they are only partly
and not quite consistently glossed. The map of Africa on p. 11 does not
give any language information, which would have been welcome and is
suggested on p. 10. Also a table listing the noun-class prefixes in Shona
and Swahili would have been useful.
The other volume, Duelling Languages, represents a more recent
research interest of Carol Myers-Scotton and is more elaborate in its
structure. The main focus is described in the preface (p. vii): "... it
approaches codeswitching as a product of the 'psycholinguistic stress' of
two linguistic systems interacting." The model proposed in Duelling
Languages has three important features:
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First, there is always an identifiable base or matrix language (ML),
and an asymmetry between that and the embedded language (EL). The
two languages are separately processed in units called islands. The three
types of constituents listed — EL islands, ML islands, and mixed
EL -f ML constituents — do not constitute an empirical claim by them-
selves, of course; they are simply the logical possibilities.
Second, there is a fundamental distinction between function mor-
phemes and content morphemes in their distribution in CS utterances:
function morphemes in mixed ML + EL fragments can only be drawn
from the ML.
Third, there is a strong claim about the psycholinguistic basis in
sentence production of the model. Thus there is "inhibition" and "activa-
tion" of languages, etc.
Problems for the model are attached to all three of these features.
First, the definition of ML is not unproblematic. On p. 3 the ML is termed
"the main language in CS utterances in a number of ways." On p. 68 an
"ML criterion" is proposed, leading to the definition of ML as "the
language of more morphemes in interaction types including intrasenten-
tial CS." It must be based on a discourse sample and exclude cultural
borrowings and words for new concepts. Considering this definition, take
an example like (2), cited in isolation (we follow Myers-Scotton's practice
of italicizing the embedded language material):
(2) Ni-check all that particular day's constructions.
Ί should ...' (Swahili-English, p. 146)
Since Swahili ni 'first person subject clitic' is a function morpheme, we
must take the author's word for it that the sentence was taken from a
discourse that was mostly Swahili, since the matrix language in (2) is
taken to be Swahili. A similar example is (3), again cited in isolation:
(3) It's only essential services amba-zo zi-na
COMP-cl.10 cllO-PRES-
function right now.
It's only essential services which function right now.'
(Swahili-English, p. 130)
Consider now a stretch of more extended discourse, for which again
Swahili is taken to be the matrix language:
(4) A: Bwana O., niambie kuhusu mpango wa posta wa save as you
earn.
'Mr. O., tell me about the postal plan of "save as you earn."'
B: Mpango huu ni the customer fills forms and surrenders
plan this is
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kiasi fulani ch-a pesa
amount some cl.7-of money
say like 200 shillings every month for two years. The interest
paid is good and the customer can collect it after the expiration
of the agreed period.
Tuna customers we-ngi sana kwa mpango huu.
we have cl.2-many very in plan this
(Swahili-English, p. 72)
The plan is [that] the customer fills forms and surrenders some
amount of money, say like 200 shillings every month for two
years. The interest paid is good and the customer can collect
it after the expiration of the agreed period. We have very many
customers in this plan.'
It is hard to see what purpose is gained and what criteria can be used to
assume that Swahili is the ML throughout. Yet, this is what the author
is implying.
A related issue is the relation between the definition of ML used by
Myers-Scotton and the notion of "matrix clause" from traditional gram-
mar. In the following cases, the matrix clause is in the EL, and the
embedded clause in the ML:
(5) Mais toi, on dirait que ozokima te bajours oyo.
'But you, one would say that you do not job these days.'
(Lingala-French, p. 132)
(6) You didn't have to worry que somebody te iba a tirar con cerveza ο
una botella or something like that.
'You didn't have to worry that somebody was going to throw beer
or a bottle at you or something like that.'
(Spanish-English, p. 128)
Given that genuine matrix/embedded clause asymmetries are generally
assumed to have a correlate in sentence planning, it is difficult to conceive
of a matrix clause being "embedded," language-wise, in a complement
clause. Furthermore, somebody cannot constitute an EL island, given
Myers-Scotton's definition of EL islands (p. 138): "All islands must be
composed of at least two lexemes/morphemes in a hierarchical
relationship."
Thus there remains a tension between a structural view of ML and a
view in terms of incremental sentence production, but the two cannot be
entirely separate. The author even suggests that the ML could change
during a sentence (p. 70). While this may appear to be correct, it limits
the empirical scope of the notion "matrix": it may be a notion primarily
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relevant at the level of constituency. Change in ML is prevalent in
changing bilingual communities (pp. 73-74). However, many bilingual
communities, particularly migrant communities, are precisely charac-
terized by rapid change. Thus models in terms of this notion may have
a limited usefulness.
To sum up, although there is much evidence that indeed in many cases
CS is asymmetrical and involves a "dominant," "base," or "matrix"
language, the particular way Myers-Scotton defines it is fraught with
difficulties. Indeed, it is problematic to adopt the notion as the fundamen-
tal basis for a theory of CS.
A second problem is that separating function from nonfunction mor-
phemes is far from easy. The formal definitions of function morphemes
in terms of quantification (reminding one of Jakobson's shifters) and
theta theory (pp. 99-102) are more reminiscent of grammatical models
of CS than of psycholinguistic models. The definition of quantifiers, for
instance, as system morphemes, elements that cannot be embedded out-
side an EL island, immediately runs into empirical problems. The quanti-
fier somebody in (6) is illicit, in Myers-Scotton's view, as in kuch 'some'
in (7):
(7) Of all the places John has hidden kuch books bathroom men.
some in
Of all the places, John has hidden some books in the bathroom.'
(Hindi-English, p. 43)
Strictly speaking, kuch is not illicit in (7) since Hindi is assumed to be
the ML here by Myers-Scotton, but given the absence of context there
is no reason for this latter assumption, except to save the definition of
system morpheme.
Clearly, there is a need to distinguish content words from function
words in some way when analyzing CS, but the distinction may well
involve several dimensions and be in part language-specific.
Third, embedding in a theory of speech production is problematic. We
can grant that psycholinguistically there is an important difference
between function and content morphemes. However, if we assume with
Levelt, as Myers-Scotton does, that sentence production is "lexically
driven," we are talking about the content morphemes (such as the predi-
cate) that drive production, not the function morphemes. Why then
should the latter impose the matrix language? Why are specialized mor-
phosyntactic procedures triggered by lemmas? On p. 118 the author
writes, "Either ML or EL content morphemes may be 'called' by ML or
EL lemmas respectively, but they both appear in slots prepared by ML
lemmas." Now take an example like
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(8) Tajziw tajdiru dak la regulation [sic] djal les naissances ...
They come and do that-[the limitation] of [(the) births] '
(p. 106)
What Myers-Scotton would have to propose here is that the French
elements are replacing abstract Arabic lemmas, which trigger the Arabic
sentence frame, which then leads to the selection of Arabic system mor-
phemes such as dak 'that' and dyal OP. Now that latter assumption
seems correct, but the assumption that the medical discourse is regulated
by abstract Arabic lemmas is implausible. If one examines the fragment
from which the sentence is taken, from the work of Bentahila and Davies
(1992), it is clear that the Moroccan doctors or interns are talking IN
ARABIC about the FRENCH medical universe, implying the complete
European medical vocabulary, set of concepts, etc., that they have
received from their training. Selection of a morphosyntactic frame is not
linked directly to lemma selection but is a separate process.
The same issue can be broached by looking at the precise definition of
'lemma'. It is not clear exactly what Myers-Scotton's view is on the
lemma in relation to the bilingual. In figure 4.3 on p. 116, lemma selection
triggers the calling of specialized morphosyntactic procedures. Hence one
would assume that lemmas are language-specific. However, further down
in the same figure we notice that the lexemes called by lemmas are
realized. Where is congruency tested in the process of speech production?
The notion of lemma fluctuates: sometimes it is abstract, as in Garrett's
perspective (p. 48), and sometimes it is language-specific. If we take
lemmas to be abstract, language-independent entities, congruency match-
ing could take place quite early on. In that case, it is hard to see how
they could trigger language-specific morphosyntactic procedures by them-
selves. If we take lemmas to be language-specific entities, it is not clear
where and how congruency can be defined.
In addition to these three main problems, there are other problematic
aspects of Myers-Scotton's work. A first one concerns variation. On
pp. 2-3 the author relies on the competence/performance distinction to
account for variability in CS: the model is supposed to provide the overall
possibilities, while what actually occurs is determined by performance.
While it is an empirical issue, yet to be settled, whether all cases of CS
will be accounted for by the model, it is clear that some of the more
interesting of present-day CS studies look at systematic variation between
subgroups of speakers switching between the same two languages. The
variation is associated with membership of different generations within
a migrant community, bilingual dominance and proficiency, socio-
linguistic and cultural orientation, etc. The present model, at first glance,
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offers little in this respect. The weaker language of a bilingual can function
as the ML, for instance (p. 67).
A further issue is the treatment of peripheral elements. At the same
time Myers-Scotton establishes an implicational hierarchy of EL islands
(pp. 144-147), which implies that peripheral elements can be switched
more easily, but the notion of peripherality is not defined in terms of the
MLF model itself. Myers-Scotton explains the implicational hierarchy of
EL islands as follows (p. 144):
(...) the central constituents carry the main semantic weight of the sentence; it
makes sense that they should be either in ML islands or possibly in ML -f EL
constituents. For the reasons outlined above (...) in defining the ML, the ML
has more psycho-sociolinguistic dominance in the discourse under consideration.
And to allow elements which are peripheral to the communicative intention to
appear in the EL (as islands) seems a likely corollary.
There are two comments to be made on this functional explanation.
First, the importance of switched elements as indices of (changing) RO
sets (cf. Social Motivations) would suggest that switched elements must
be central to the communicative intention of the speaker: one would,
therefore, expect more central constituents to appear as EL islands.
Second, the claim that peripheral constituents are also peripheral to the
core of the communicative intention is disputable: time and manner PPs,
for instance, add essential information to an utterance. A structural
explanation of the hierarchy seems to be far more convincing: peripheral
constituents such as time PPs are peripheral to argument structure and
hence can be switched more easily.
In a number of places, it is clear from the presentation that the notion
of island cannot be maintained. On pp. 112-115 the discussion of bare
forms is not quite satisfactory. The forms are not always grammatical
according to the ML grammar, and it remains unclear by what grammar
they are governed. Conversely, on p. 150 the "leakage" from ML into
EL islands is not predicted by the model. On p. 134 it is suggested under
(c) that an ML procedure could provide an EL affix. What kind of ML
procedure could this be?
On pp. 193-194 a distinction is made between CS and borrowing in
terms of predictability: borrowings are assumed to be recurrent, switches
not. Recurrent switching is definitely possible, however, and characteristic
of many bilingual corpora, in line with findings from studies in corpus
linguistics to the effect that recurrence is not a distinguishing characteristic
of the lexicon in a strict sense.
Prosody is not considered in enough detail for a psycholinguistic model.
Along the same lines, on p. 126 and p. 189 phonological factors are
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adduced as an argument, but the status of phonology in the model is
rather peripheral.
The extension of the model in chapter 7 to "deep grammatical borrow-
ing" and other contact phenomena is rather sketchily worked out, but
will surely stimulate much interesting research.
In spite of these critical remarks we wish to stress again the importance
of Myers-Scotton's work for the field. It has linked psycholinguistic,
sociolinguistic, and grammatical concerns and contains a number of
valuable ideas that can lead to further hypotheses and a clearer view of
how bilinguals function.
University of Amsterdam PEETER MUYSKEN
VINCENT DE ROOIJ
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Jacques Arends, Pieter Muysken, and Norval Smith, editors: Pidgins and
Creoles. An Introduction. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1994.
This book provides a new introduction to the study of pidgin and creole
languages, written jointly by linguists at the University of Amsterdam,
who are well known for their contributions to the study of these lan-
guages. Not surprisingly, given the focus of the work being done there,
the book concentrates primarily on the Atlantic Creoles. Although it is
unusual for a textbook of this type to be an edited collection, this practice
works very well and has many advantages in a field such as pidgin and
Creole studies that involves so many languages, thereby inevitably limiting
the expertise of any one individual. In addition to the three editors, Lilian
Adamson, Rene Appel, Peter Bakker, Adrienne Bruyn, Hans den Besten,
Vincent de Rooij, Silvia Kouwenberg, Marike Post, Cefas van Rossem,
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Hein van der Voort, Tonjes Veenstra, and Ludo Verhoeven serve as
authors and coauthors of various chapters of the book. The resulting
volume is both highly readable and informative, as well as timely in the
way it addresses current theoretical issues in universal grammar. It covers
most of the topics one would expect to find in an introductory text, such
as theories of origin and structural features, as well as many areas not
generally represented in textbooks such as the use of Creoles as literary
languages and in education.
The book is organized into five sections. Part I, "General Aspects,"
includes six chapters. There is an overview of the field (Muysken/Smith),
a chapter each on pidgins (Bakker) and Creoles (Arends), one on mixed
languages (Bakker/Muysken), one on variation and the concept of the
Creole continuum (de Rooij), and two chapters dealing with education
(Appel and Verhoeven), and Creole literature (Adamson/van Rossem).
Part II contains four chapters covering theories of genesis. These address
the question of European input (den Besten/Muysken/Smith), non-
European input (Arends/Kouwenberg/Smith), gradualist vs. develop-
mental hypotheses (Arends/Bruyn), and universalist approaches
(Muy sken/ Veenstra).
Part III contains eight chapters with sketches of individual Creoles
including Eskimo Pidgin (van der Voort), Haitian (Muysken/Veenstra),
Saramaccan (Bakker/Smith/Veenstra), Shaba Swahili (de Rooij),
Fa d'Ambu (Post), Papiamento (Kouwenberg/Muysken), Sranan
(Adamson/Smith), and Berbice Dutch (Kouwenberg). This select cover-
age give students a good sampling both geographic and linguistic of the
diversity in the Atlantic region. Haitian, for instance, representing a
French-based Creole, has the largest number of speakers of any of the
Caribbean Creoles and is also one of the best studied languages. Eskimo
is a case where creolization has involved an indigenous language known
for its agglutinative structure. Similarly, Shaba Swahili has its base in
contact between related indigenous African languages of the Bantu
family. The fact that it is the outcome of adult second-language acquisi-
tion rather than children's first-language acquisition makes its status as
Creole problematic. Also representing a Creole from Africa is Fa d'Ambu,
a Portuguese-based Creole spoken on the island of Annobon on the West
African coast. Saramaccan, often thought of as the most African in its
structure, is well known for being a radical Creole, that is, the most
grammatically deviant from its lexifier languages (English and
Portuguese). Papiamento is a Portuguese/Spanish-based Creole spoken
on the Netherlands Antilles islands of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curasao.
Sranan is an English-based Creole spoken in Surinam, South America.
Berbice Dutch with its four or five remaining speakers is one of the few
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surviving Dutch-based Creoles. I think these sketches would be better
placed after the discussion of grammatical features that follows in Part IV.
This allows students time to acquire more knowledge of grammatical
terminology useful in understanding the examples given in the sketches.
Individual instructors can of course postpone assigning these chapters
until they have covered the basic material.
Part IV concentrates on grammatical features and comprises five chap-
ters dealing with major syntactic structures and categories: TMA particles
and auxiliaries (Bakker/Post/van der Voort), noun phrases (Bruyn),
reflexives (Muysken/Smith), serial verbs (Muysken/Veenstra), and front-
ing (Veenstra/den Besten). Part V contains a concluding chapter written
by the editors, and an annotated list of Creoles, pidgins, and mixed
languages by Norval Smith, which is a welcome update and addition to
Hancock's repertory (1977). It provides some information on number of
speakers and the linguistic status of the languages. There is also a map
showing the location of the languages frequently cited in the text.
While the authors' concentration on languages they know well avoids
some of the pitfalls in trying to cover such a large number of diverse
languages, there are still some problems with examples and data unfamil-
iar to them. It is striking, for example, that most of the examples from
Tok Pisin are problematic for one reason or another. They gloss bin as
an anterior marker with no comment (p. 123). I believe Sankoff (1990)
is right in claiming that Tok Pisin has not yet grammaticalized an anterior
marker. Where bin occurs, it is by and large used as a simple past rather
than a past before past. In their discussion of relativization (p. 128) they
have incorrectly glossed ia as a predicate marker, though I believe this
is a typographical error. In any event, strictly speaking, ia is not a relative
marker but simply reinforces or brackets overtly a clause that could be
construed as relative on other grounds such as pronominalization or
prosody (see Romaine 1992). In Muysken and Smith's chapter on reflex-
ives the Tok Pisin example my yet is glossed as '(1st sg head) myself
(p. 271). I believe my must be a typographical error for mi, which is the
first person singular pronoun. However, I don't know of anyone who
has proposed the derivation of yet from 'head'. In the editors' concluding
chapter they cite (p. 321) Tok Pisin be as a future marker. I believe this
is a typographical error for bai (or its reduced form bd). While the
development of bai from the temporal adverb baimbai is often cited as a
textbook case of grammaticalization, the facts are considerably more
complex and rather messier than the standard account repeated here (see
Romaine 1995). Nevertheless, I agree with the editors' conclusions that
grammaticalization is a promising approach for further research on
pidgins and Creoles.
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While the exposition is generally clear and concise throughout, I have
some doubt about the editors' claim that the book does "not demand a
high level of previous linguistic knowledge" (p. v). Terms are often used
with no examples or definitions. For instance, in Bakker's chapter on
pidgins he states (p. 33) that the morphological process of reduplication
is common but not universal in Creole languages though rare in pidgins
as a productive process. He then mentions a few languages where it
occurs but gives no examples. Examples that make the process clear do
not appear until p. 171. The book will thus be best suited to those who
already have considerable knowledge of descriptive linguistics and some
appreciation for current theoretical concerns.
Merton College, University of Oxford SUZANNE ROMAINE
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Speech act theory, or rather theories — to acknowledge the many elabora-
tions that the sketchy proposals found in the canonical texts have
received — need no introduction. They are "one of the more lasting
products of the linguistic movement in philosophy of the mid-twentieth
century" (Price, p. 132). However, another book devoted to their reexam-
ination and reassessment does need an introduction, especially given
some recent caustic appraisals and subsequent theoretical developments:
Today few pragmaticists see speech act theory as anything other than a shorthand
way of discussing speaker meaning: a helpful means of abstraction whose termi-
nology lingers on because it is such common currency and useful for that reason
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alone (Leech and Thomas 1990: 194; cf. Meggle 1985 and Burkhardt 1990 for
the same observation rather differently expressed and the discussion in Zagar
1991 and Allen 1994).
By way of introduction, the editor (pp. 1-25) of the present book
attempts to argue that (i) the usual exclusive focus on propositional
content is unpromising because (ii) illocutionary acts are meaning-deter-
mining acts and so (iii) the identification of what a speaker means in
using a sentence of his or her language is not possible unless one further
determines which from among the various acts he or she is engaged in
performing but (iv) there are many fundamental questions concerning
both the internal structure of speech act theory and (v) its external
relations that have not been sufficiently investigated. Hence the need for
the present book. It is a collection of 22 original papers on the foundations
of speech act theories, but it must be said at the outset that the present
reviewer finds that the attention paid to these matters does not always
lead to conceptual advance.
The bulk of the papers are philosophical in character. On the one hand
there are informal, ordinary language-type philosophy papers; on the
other hand there are papers that make their case by exploiting the
resources of formal languages. In the first category, William Alston, in
"Illocutionary meaning and linguistic meaning" (pp. 29-49), indicates
the general character, with appropriate simplifications, of his proposals
to equate linguistic meaning with illocutionary act potential. He has
pursued this topic for many years (cf. Alston 1963, 1964a, 1964b), and
this paper is intended to serve as a prologue to a forthcoming book with
the same title. John Kearns, in "Meaning, structure and speech acts"
(pp. 50-79), presents some revisions, in an idiosyncratic notation, to
Kearns (1984). He claims to have developed more adequate alternative
conceptions of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, but these are intro-
duced abstractly, with minimal illustration, and the ordinary working
linguist is unlikely to find them very helpful. Huw Price, in "Semantic
minimalism and the Frege point" (pp. 132-155), alleges that a move to
what he calls minimal semantics allows the philosophical nonfactualist
to sidestep arguments, in particular the Frege argument, that are usually
regarded as extremely damaging to nonfactualism. This category also
contains papers by Charles Travis ("On being truth-valued,"
pp. 167-186), Jennifer Hornsby ("Illocution and its significance,"
pp. 187-207), Steven Davis ("Anti-indivualism and speech act theory,"
pp. 208-219), Savas Tsohatzidis ("The gap between speech acts and
mental states," pp. 220-233, and "Speaker meaning, sentence meaning
and metaphor," pp. 365-373), Rod Bertolet ("Are there indirect speech
acts?", pp. 335-349), David Holdcroft ("Indirect speech acts and propo-
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sitional content," pp. 350-364), and David Harrah ("On the vectoring
of speech acts," pp. 374-390).
In the second category, the more formal studies, there are a number
of interesting papers. D. Shwayder, in "A semantics of utterance, formal-
ized" (pp. 80-99), outlines the basics of test-theoretic semantics, which
he offers as an alternative to the more usual model-theoretic framework.
The paper is, by the author's own admission, "sketchy," and Shwayder
says that he will "not burden this paper with details, which [he has]
found to be sometimes technically challenging" (p. 94). But it appears
that "meaning, ..., is to be secured, not by a prior selection of referable
objects, but rather by indications of procedures for getting to such
objects" (p. 94). The first volume of a fuller statement of this kind of
semantics can be found in Shwayder (1992). Daniel Vanderveken, in "A
complete formulation of a simple logic of elementary illocutionary acts"
(pp. 99-131), presents a glimpse of a logic that is explained in more
detail elsewhere (Vanderveken 1990, 1991; cf. Turner 1993). His aim is
perfectly compatible with the model-theoretic semanticist but his ambi-
tion is to go beyond theories of truth and to design a theory of satisfac-
tion. He argues that a semantic theory of truth for natural language is
the special sub-theory for assertive speech acts of the more general theory of
satisfaction for speech acts with an arbitrary illocutionary force. On my account,
linguistic competence is inseperable from performance: it is essentially the speak-
er's ability to perform and understand the illocutionary acts which are the
meanings of utterances. Moreover, illocutionary logic is needed to formalize the
practical and theoretical valid inferences that human beings are able to make in
virtue of linguistic competence (p. 100).
This work deserves more widespread acknowledgement but the technical
expertise it requires to be appreciated is extremely high, and it is going
to remain a minority interest in the absence of a reader-friendly introduc-
tion. Finally, an acquaintance with abstract algebra would assist the
reading of "Algebra of elementary social acts" by Arthur Merin
(pp. 234-263). This paper appears to be one that is conceptually distant
from what goes normally by the name of speech act theory.
In addition to the mainly philosophical papers there are some, though
few, contributions that orient very definitively toward linguistics. Jerrold
Sadock, in "Toward a grammatically realistic typology of speech acts"
(pp. 393-406), and William Croft, in "Speech act classification, language
typology and cognition" (pp. 460-477), take Sadock and Zwicky (1985)
as their point of departure and attempt to improve upon the numerous
philosophical taxonomies of illocutionary acts by incorporating relevant
facts from a broad diversity of languages. Both acknowledge the tentative
character and limitations of their proposals, and they recommend that
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further work be done. And Robert Harnish, in "Mood, meaning and
speech acts" (pp. 407-459) sketches a theory of mood that satisfies certain
intuitive conditions of adequacy that previous theories failed to satisfy.
This is another paper that foreshadows a forthcoming book with the
same title, and the reader is frequently referred to this work.
But once the philosophical and linguistic studies have been put to one
side, there are five promising papers that examine aspects of the interface
between semantics and pragmatics and that deserve careful attention.
These papers are by Francois Recanati ("Contextualism and anti-
contextualism in the philosophy of language," pp. 156-166), Kent Bach
("Semantic slack: what is said and more," pp. 267-291), Graham Bird
("Relevance theory and speech acts," pp. 292-311), Asa Kasher
("Modular speech act theory: programme and results," pp. 312-322),
and Marcelo Dascal ("Speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics: some
differences of detail that make a difference," pp. 323-334).
Bird and Dascal are concerned with speech act theory's "external
relations." Bird defends speech act theories against the relevance-theoretic
claim that "[t]he vast range of data that speech-act theorists have been
concerned with is of no special interest to pragmatics" (Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 243). He reduces this general claim to seven more specific
theses:
(la) Speech act theory has no place in linguistics.
(Ib) Speech act theory has a restricted role to play in linguistics.
(2a) Speech act theory's restricted role is a matter of its relative
unimportance.
(2b) Speech act theory's restricted role is a matter of a necessary limita-
tion on the range of speech acts that deserve to be accommodated
within a linguistic theory.
(3a) Speech act theory should be replaced by relevance theory.
(3b) Relevance theory provides the proper theoretical foundation for
the restricted role of speech act theory.
(3c) Relevance theory adds a complementary psychological theory into
which speech act theory can be incorporated.
And he demonstrates that arguments adduced to support the strong
theses (la), (2a), and (3a) are open to serious objections and that there
remains considerable ambiguity as to how the weaker theses (Ib), (2b),
(3b), and (3c) are to be defended. He concludes that although "[tjhere
is room for a psychological supplement to speech act theory [ä la thesis
(3c)] ... it is doubtful that [the] P[rinciple of] R[elevance] provides it"
(p. 310). This paper should be made compulsory reading, especially for
the more strident relevance theoreticians, for it documents a number of
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ambiguities within the entire program that need to be clarified before the
theory can be properly evaluated. Recall an early warning: "Informal
explanations, not based on formal theory, particularly those that trade
on words like 'relevant,' are always liable to the fallacy of equivocation"
(Gazdar 1979: 54).
Dascal's is another paper that merits broad readership. He attempts
to criticize a particular speech act theory and, by implication, defend the
merits of the conversational hypothesis. He argues as follows: (i) Searle's
speech act theory and Grice's theory of conversation have often been
conjoined, or at least seen as complementary; (ii) this is an entirely
natural manoeuvre as the theories are superficially quite compatible;
(iii) both theories, for example, are reactions to the Wittgensteinian
slogan that "meaning is use"; (iv) meaning is NOT use: semantics is
emphatically NOT pragmatics; (v) but here the compatibility between the
two theories ends; (vi) Searle and Grice distinguish between meaning and
use in two, incompatible, and indeed sometimes inconsistent, ways;
(vii) for Searle, for example,
[s]ometimes it is the distinction between truth conditions and illocutionary forces;
sometimes, the distinction between the domain of logical relations and the domain
of some "quasi-logical" relations; sometimes it has to do with what is and what
is not "embedded" in the set of institutional conditions required for the perfor-
mance of speech acts ... none of these pairs is exclusively on the side of use or
meaning (pp. 328-329).
(viii) The difference between Searle and Grice, and in particular the
differences in the kind of understanding they have of what is "use," can






grammatical model nongrammatical model
constitutive rules heuristic rules
implication implicature
semantic pragmatic
Dascal's conclusion is that
[s]peech act theory seeks to treat what it calls "use" by means of strict rules,
which can be formalized into a precise illocutionary logic. It seeks to demonstrate
that use can be treated as rigorously as meaning has been — But it may have
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gone too far in its reduction of use to meaning thereby proving rather than
disproving the slogan it originally opposed (p. 333).
This is a good, cautionary, paper that alerts the reader to the pitfalls of
premature pick-and-mix pragmatic theorizing. The moral is simple: do
not be too impressed by superficial theoretical compatibility: examine
very carefully the background (cf. Searle 1980).
The papers by Recanati and Bach continue the exploration of the
meaning/use interface. Recanati speaks in terms of contextualism (aka
pragmatics, aka use) and anticontextualism (aka semantics, aka meaning)
and suggests that anticontextualism is based on the following claim:
(a) For every statement that can be made using a context-sensitive
sentence in a given context, there is an eternal sentence that can be
used to make the same statement in any context.
In reply, the contextualist manufactures arguments having to do with the
facts of reference, predication, quantification, standards of precision, and
tense to deny (a). None of these arguments are controversy-free, of
course, but Recanati's purpose is not to adjudicate on these factual
matters. Instead, he wishes to focus attention on the nature of the
methodological principles that are employed. He discerns two: the
parallelism principle,
(b) If a (syntactically complete) sentence can be used in different
contexts to say different things (to express different propositions),
then the explanation for this contextual variation of content is that
the sentence has different linguistic meanings — is semantically
ambiguous;
and modified Occam's Razor,
(c) Senses (linguistic meanings) are not to be multiplied beyond
necessity;
and he argues that (b) and (c) allow analyses to veer to conclusions of
semantic ambiguity or to conclusions of a partition between sense and
implicature. But these principles do not allow the possibility that the
propositional content of an utterance depends upon context. He has no
positive proposals to make about the nature of contextually variable
truth conditions (cf. Recanati 1989 and especially 1993) but limits his
ambitions to observing that this possibility has been eclipsed in the more
orthodox discussions of the demarcation between meaning and use.
Bach, on the other hand, both here and in Bach (1994), has a lot to
say about what he calls "the middle ground" between what is said
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(meaning/semantics) and what is implicated (use/pragmatics). The argu-
ment attempts to establish a case for there being presemantic pragmatic
processes in addition to the more usually acknowledged postsemantic
processes (cf. Levinson 1988a). By way of explanation, consider the
following examples:
(1) You're not going to die.
(2) I haven't eaten.
The literal meaning of the sentences expressed by the utterances (1) and
(2), Bach argues, determines a definite proposition with a definite set of
truth conditions as follows:
(1-TC) The addressee of the utterance of (1) is immortal.
(2-TC) The utterer of (2) has not eaten prior to the time of utterance.
(1-TC) and (2-TC) are what Bach calls minimal propositions. An utterer
of (1) or (2) is understood to be communicating not the minimal proposi-
tion but some expansion of it:
(Γ) You're not going to die [from that cut on your finger].
(2') I haven't eaten [breakfast today].
Now consider the following examples:
(3) Steel isn't strong enough.
(4) Fred almost robbed a bank.
(3) and (4) are what Bach calls propositional radicals. An utterer of (3)
and (4) is understood to be communicating not a propositional radical
but some completion of it. The propositions themselves are semantically
incomplete in that something must be added for the sentence to express
a complete and determinate proposition:
(3') Steel isn't strong enough [for something or other].
(4') Fred nearly succeeded in/barely refrained from robbing a bank.
So the picture is one of at least two kinds of propositions — minimal
propositions and propositional radicals — which, respectively, undergo
pragmatic processes of expansion and completion and which in turn
deliver fully fledged propositions, complete with the appropriate truth
conditions, and these form the basis, in turn, on which the more usual
implicature-generating pragmatic processes apply. There is a certain
amount of additional attention that these ideas need to receive, of course.
Bach, like Recanati and others who explore "the middle ground," speak
somewhat pretheoretically about the different kinds of propositions and
the presemantic pragmatic processes that serve to supplement them. But
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this is a promising area for future research and we should wait impatiently
for further results.
The last paper is "Modular speech act theory — programme and
results" by Asa Kasher. It is a mainly programmatic paper about how
speech act theory may be modularized and made compatible with a
number of Kasher's earlier proposals (e.g. Kasher 1987, 1991a, 1991b,
among many others). I have found the study of this work extremely
rewarding and recommend it to anyone seeking a pragmatic extension
to generative linguistics and modular psychology.
This book, to conclude an overlong review, will find a ready audience.
EVERYONE working in semantics or pragmatics is conversant with the
original theses, and contributions to the elaboration of these will be on
every course reading list and in many research bibliographies. But I have
to say that I believe an opportunity has been missed in this book. I am
thinking of the issues attending to (i) the absorption of the notion of
speech act and speech act theory more generally into the notion of face-
threatening act and politeness theory more generally (cf. Brown and
Levinson 1987): such an absorption makes the design of utterances
addressee-directed and not just speaker-centered, with obvious advan-
tages for a subsequent theory of conversation; (ii) the capability, or
indeed incapability, of speech act theories in general to serve as the
foundation of theories of conversation (cf. Levinson 198la, 1981b; van
Rees 1992); (iii) the projection problem for illocutionary forces (cf.
Harnish 1979); (iv) elaborations of the standard model of participation
(Clark and Carlson 1982; Fill 1986; Levinson 1988b; McCawley 1984;
Zheng 1993); and (v) cross-cultural applications (cf. Blum-Kulka et al.
1989; Gass and Neu 1994). These matters are given scant, if any, attention
in this book, and they are, in a wider context, very important. Although
it was possible for John Searle to say, more than ten years ago, that
speech act theory was "so much fun" (Searle 1984) because it had no
history, and therefore it wasn't necessary to worry about what the great
philosophers of the past had to say about it, the time may now have
come to worry whether speech act theory has a future. Too many of the
contributions to this collection look backward: too few point forward.
University of Brighton KEN TURNER
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Lynda Mugglestone: "Talking Proper." The Rise of Accent as Social
Symbol Oxford: Clarendon, 1995. viii + 353 pp. £35 (hb).
Everyone will agree that there is need for further research into the period
in which the social structures and much of the linguistic makeup of
modern Britain were formed — the nineteenth century, which saw the
development of an agrarian society into an industrialized, urban one.
The somewhat disappointing account of the time by Phillipps (1984),
which was almost exclusively based on literary sources, and the sketches
by Honey (1988, 1989), which outlined the main trends in the establish-
ment of accent as a sociolinguistic marker in the nineteenth century and
the function of the schools in the process, left room for further and more
detailed explorations. Mugglestone set out to fill at least some of the
remaining gaps. She sketches the prescriptive tradition of the eighteenth
century, giving due weight to the authoritative statements by Sheridan
and Walker as to the accepted or preferable pronunciations of problem
sounds and individual words, and then follows up nineteenth-century
attitudes in great detail on the basis of a notably comprehensive collection
of relevant statements drawn from the spate of conduct books that so
vividly express the concerns, especially of social climbers, about proper
pronunciation. The selection and interpretation of these passages, many
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of them hitherto virtually unknown (the anonymous booklets often erron-
eously catalogued in individual libraries, or not listed at all) certainly
make up the most informative part of the book. There is, in addition, a
great amount of information on how these attitudes relate to passages
in the major nineteenth-century novelists, ranging from Jane Austen to
George Gissing; much of Mugglestone's interpretation is excellent and
stimulates us to reread the novels with a wary eye (and ear) tuned to
social differences linguistically signalled in the speech of the characters.
There are, however, a number of reasons that make the book not quite
as useful as an analytical tool for applied historical sociolinguistics as
many readers might have wished:
1. The huge amount of complex material (which was difficult to struc-
ture according to individual features, social and attitudinal relevance,
changing evaluation, and relevance/reliability of sources used) is not
arranged in an ideal way. Readers are likely not to see the forest for
individual trees, with hundreds of individual quotations crowding in on
them, some of them repeated, and without a clear organization helping
them to digest this embarras de richesses. For instance, I would like to
have had an extensive justification of why certain markers were selected
and then the stigmatized variants of the variables (h-), (-ng), (a:), (Vr),
(1), and (wh) were discussed together, combined with their changing
evaluations. In the book under review, no coherent sociolinguistic picture
evolves, nor are the limits of reconstruction discussed. In particular, the
significance of the great divide of 1830-1840 is not sufficiently indicated,
with the material ranging from 1750 to 1900 interpreted en bloc.
2. Most of the discussion rightly concentrates on the nineteenth cen-
tury, but Mugglestone is surprisingly silent on grammar books of the
time; not even Michael's fundamental work (1987), which lists 800 +
such reference books dating from the nineteenth century and analyzes
their relevance for the teaching of English, is mentioned. (Note that basic
reference books for the eighteenth century, like Alston's bibliography
and Leonard's and Sundby et al.'s analyses of eighteenth-century
prescriptivism, are also omitted.)
3. Mugglestone includes Phillipps's and Honey's works in her refer-
ences, but she does not discuss how her research relates to that of these
predecessors. In particular, although there are many details on the func-
tion of the schools, especially the public schools, in the teaching of correct
pronunciation in chapter 6 (pp. 258-315), there is no coherent account
of how the antecedents of R.P. came to be planted and cultivated. Is
Honey right in his plausible but not uncontroversial claims? A book that
takes up in its title the phrase "Talking proper" of Honey (1988) would
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lead us to expect a thorough discussion, and possibly correction, of the
earlier hypotheses.
4. There is no exploration of how the shibboleth of proper pronuncia-
tion came to replace earlier concerns about "correct grammar." Was it
because all the other fields had been properly regulated, pronunciation
being the only section in which variation was not yet completely diagnos-
tic of social class and proper education? How do we explain that some
features were oriented to spelling, as (h), (ng) and (wh) obviously were,
but (r), lost after vowels in the southern standard, developed in the
opposite direction? How do we explain the wavering of (1), and how the
rise of (a:) from stigma to respectability? The sources quoted in the book
do not provide any coherent answers.
5. If information on the function of the schools in the standardization
process is incomplete, there is even less on social history in general. What
are the consequences of industrialization, urbanization, and drastically
increased mobility (regional and social)? What was the status of surviving
traditional dialect, and the emergence of continuation of "modified"
R.P., for instance in the new industrial centers of the North?
6. What was the regional and social provenance of the authors of
grammar books and conduct books? How do we explain the acceptability
of an Irish Sheridan and a number of Scotsmen as umpires of correct
pronunciation for English society — the views on the provincial pronunci-
ations of these regions being what they were?
7. Mugglestone refers to modern sociolinguistic research by Labov,
Romaine, and Trudgill, but where she does, it is to point out superficial
similarities that implicitly accept that the notions of "standard," "pres-
tige," and "stigma" are the same in nineteenth-century Britain and the
modern world, whether Britain or the US. However, a more thorough
sociolinguistic analysis of her data would have been in order, which
might then have provided arguments for discussing the change (or sta-
bility) of sociolinguistic correlations.
The book under review has brought us forward a great step toward
understanding both nineteenth-century social psychology as related to
linguistic features stigmatized as shibboleths and the urge of the middle
classes to overcome these discredited features — only to find that new
linguistic barriers had been raised by the elite. However, many gaps
remain, and are waiting to be filled — there is certainly room for another
book on the same topic.
University of Cologne MANFRED GÖRLACH
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